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PROPERTY
I. ZO'NqG
A. Incompatible Uses
Niggel v. City of Colum7b,& deals with the power of the Board
of Adjustment to deny a zoning permit, sought by a landowner
and approved by the Zoning Administrator, for the construction
of a gasoline filling station in a zoning district which expressly
includes gasoline filling stations as a permitted use. A major
point of contention in this case was whether the nature of the
surrounding districts was a proper factor for the Board to
consider on hearing an appeal from the decision of the Zoning
Administrator to grant a zoning permit.
The plaintiffs, Niggel and Hess Realty Corp., relying on a
zoning classification of 0-4, general commercial, applying to
Mrs. Niggel's property, entered into a lease whereby Hess was to
construct and operate a gasoline filling station on a portion of
Mrs. Niggel's property. A C-4 zoning classification expressly
includes gasoline filling stations as a permitted use.2 Under the
Zoning Ordinance of the City of Columbia no building may be
constructed unless a zoning permit is first obtained from the
Zoning Administrator, whose decisions are subject to appeal to
the Board of Adjustment. The decision of the Zoning Adminis-
trator to issue the required permit to Hess was appealed; the
Board of Adjustment, after a hearing, reversed the decision of
the Zoning Administrator and denied the permit. The grounds
on which the Board denied the permit were that "the proposed
use of the property for a filling station site would be 'incompati-
ble with the district and neighborhood in that such an operation
at this location would be potentially dangerous by reason of
noise, glare and traffic congestion.' "a The circuit court, re-
viewing the action of the Board of Adjustment under a writ of
certiorari, reversed the Board's decision.
On appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, the ap-
pellant contended that the Board of Adjustment had authority
to deny the permit, even though the use was expressly per-
1. 254 S.C. 19, 173 S.E2d 136 (1970).
2. Columbia, S.C., Zoning Ordinance 87 (1963).
3. 254 S.C. 19, 22, 173 S.E2d 136, 137 (1970). It is interesting to note
that there was at that time an existing filling station directly across the street
from the property in question and within the same C-4 zoning district. Id.
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mitted, under a provision of the zoning ordinance dealing with
0-4 districts which includes under the heading, Prohibited
Uses and Structures:
Any use which the Board of Adjustment, upon appeal
and after investigation of similar uses elsewhere, shall
find to be potentially noxious, dangerous or offensive
to persons in the district or to those who pass on the
public ways by reason of odor, smoke, noise, glare,
fumes, gas, vibration, threat of fire or explosion, ...
or likely for other reasons to be incompatible with the
character of the district.4
The appellant contended that the term, district, as used in the
above provision, means the surrounding districts or neighbor-
hoods. The C-4 district in which Mrs. Niggel's property was
located, while containing no residences, was completely sur-
rounded by residential districts.5 In denying the use permit for
the filling station, the Board of Adjustment apparently ac-
cepted the appellant's contention as to the meaning of "district"
as used in the ordinance.6 In holding that the action of the
Board of Adjustment in adopting this meaning of "district" was
error, the court stated:
The incompatability of the proposed use of respondent's
property must be determined, under the clear terms of
the Ordinance, from the character of the district in
which it is situated and not by the character of the
surrounding districts. Any other construction would
render the zoning districts meaningless because it
would, in effect, confer upon the Board of Adjustment
the power to rezone any district in the City by deter-
mining incompatability with reference to the character
of the surrounding districts and not the district in
which the property involved is located. Clearly, the
Board of Adjustment has no authority to rezone. 7
B. ReZiance on Existing Permitted Use
Pure Oil Division v. City of Co;um7,a3 arose under circum-
stances quite similar to those in Niggel, in that both cases in-
4. Columbia, S.C., Zoning Ordinance 80 (1963).
5. 254 S.C. 19, 22, 173 S.E2d 136, 137 (1970).
6. Id. at 24, 173 S.E.2d at 138.
7. Id.
8. 254 S.C. 28, 173 S.E.2d 140 (1970).
1970]
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volved the Board of Adjustment's denial of a zoning permit for
the construction of a gasoline filling station in a C-4, general
commercial, district in which gasoline filling stations are spe-
cifically permitted as a proper use. The two cases are similar
also in that in both cases the C-4: districts in question were
completely surrounded by residential districts; and in both
cases the trial court, on a writ of certiorari, reversed the decision
of the Board of Adjustment on basically the same grounds. In
Pure Oil, however, while the writ of certiorari was before the
trial court, the Columbia City Council scheduled a hearing to
consider an amendment to the zoning ordinance, the purpose of
which was to prohibit the use of the respondents' property for a
gasoline filling station. The respondents obtained an order
from the trial court restraining the City of Columbia from
taking any action to rezone the respondents' property.9 The
appellants then appealed from the order of the trial court re-
quiring the permit to be issued to the respondents and continuing
in effect the previous restraining order.
The court, affirming the order of the trial court requiring
the issuance of the permit, cited its decision in ANiggeZ which was
handed down concurrently with the decision in this case. 0' The
court then noted that the issuance of the restraining order in
this case, even if such were improper, did not affect the ultimate
rights of the parties, as the respondents would not have been
deprived of their right to the permit sought even if the ordi-
nance had been amended. 1 This holding was predicated on the
fact that the respondents, relying on the C-4 designation of their
property, had entered into a lease for the construction and
operation of a gasoline filling station on the property in ques-
tion and had undertaken an extensive reorganization of the
entire property in anticipation of the construction of the filling
station.
The court recognized the rule that, "when a zoning or building
permit has been properly issued and the owner has incurred
expenses in reliance thereon, he acquires a vested property right
9. Id. at 31, 137 S.E.2d at 141.
10. 254 S.C. at 32, 173 S.E2d at 142.
11. 254 S.C. at 33, 173 S.E2d at 142. The supreme court, citng 43 C.J.S.
Injunction § 118 (1945), and 42 Am. Jun. 2 D Injunctions §§ 170-71 (1969),
noted that the court ordinarily cannot enjoin a municipality from performing
legislative functions.
[Vol. 22.
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therein of which he cannot be deprived without cause or in the
absence of public necessity."1 2 The court continued:
We see no sound reason to protect vested rights
acquired after a permit is issued, and to deny such pro-
tection to similar rights acquired under an ordinance as
it existed at the time a proper application for a permit
is made. In both instances, the right protected is the
same, that is, the good faith reliance by the owner on
the right to use his property as permitted under the
Zoning Ordinance in force at the time of the application
for a permit.13
Citing Kerr v. City of Columbia 4 as authority for this princi-
ple, the court held that the respondents were entitled, under
the then existing ordinance, to a permit to construct and operate
a filling station on the lot in question and that the Board of
Adjustment could not legally refuse to issue it, even under a
subsequently enacted ordinance prohibiting that use.
C. Determining the Extent of a Prior Non-Conforming Use
Conway v. City of Greenvifle'15 was an action by a property
owner to require the city of Greenville to rezone a portion of his
property to permit the construction of a shopping center. The
plaintiff had purchased the property in question for the pur-
pose of operating a construction business prior to its annexation
by the city.
In opening and operating this business, the plaintiff con-
structed several buildings for use in the business, two private
residences, and a lake on the property. In addition to construct-
ing the buildings, the plaintiff used portions of the property
for the storage of heavy construction equipment and construc-
tion materials. While the property was being used in this
manner, it was annexed by the city of Greenville and automati-
cally zoned for use as an A-i single-family dwelling district.
The plaintiff shortly thereafter sought to have the property
rezoned for light industrial use, but was only partially successful,
the rear portion of the property being retained in the "A-i"
12. 254 S.C. at 34, 173 S.R.2d at 143, citing Nuckles v. Allen, 250 S.C. 123,
156 S.E.2d 633 (1967); Pendleton v. City of Columbia, 209 S.C. 394, 40
S.E.2d 499 (1946); Willis v. Tovn of Woodruff, 200 S.C. 266, 20 S.E2d
699 (1942). For a brief discussion of Nuckles v. Allen, see 1968 Survey of
South Carolina Law -Property, 20 S.C.L. REv. 643 (1968).
13. 254 S.C. at 34, 173 S.E.2d at 143.
14. 232 S.C. 405, 102 S.E.2d 364 (1958).
15. 173 S.E.2d 648 (S.C. 1970).
1970]
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category. The plaintiff later sought to have the portion of her
property zoned "H light industrial district" and a portion of
the property then zoned "A-1 single-family dwelling district"
rezoned to "E-1 shopping center district." The application was
recommended for approval by the City Planning and Zoning
Commission, but was rejected by the City Council. The plaintiff
then brought this action, in which the trial court dismissed the
complaint.
On appeal the supreme court, reversing and remanding to the
trial court with directions to the trial court to issue an appro-
priate order directing the city to reconsider the application,
considered two basic questions: (1) whether the plaintiff had
the right to use the entire property involved for business pur-
poses, and (2) whether the discontinuance of the business on the
death of the plaintiff's husband constituted abandonment of the
commercial use of the property.
In considering the first question, the court noted that in
James v. Oity of Greenville 6 the court held that the police power
of a municipality to enact zoning ordinances restricting the use
of privately owned property is not unlimited, and "does not
permit a municipality to impair or destroy vested property rights
acquired prior to the annexation of property to the city."' 7
While the defendants agreed that the plaintiff had a right to
continue the operation of the construction business on the prop-
erty after annexation, the defendants maintained that the busi-
ness use was confined to a limited area and should not be
extended to the entire tract. Accepting the statement that
the criterion [for determining the extent of an existing
non-conforming use] is whether the nature of the in-
cipient non-conforming use, in light of the character
and adaptability to such use of the entire parcel, mani-
festly implies an appropriation of the entirety to such
use prior to the adoption of the restrictive ordinances,18
the court held that the question of whether the partial use of
the tract by the plaintiff for business purposes extended to the
entire tract must be determined from the facts of the case. In
examining the facts, the court noted, inter alia, that, (1) while
the business activity centered on only a portion of the tract, the
16. 227 S.C. 565, 88 S.E2d 661 (1955).
17. 173 S.E2d at 650.
18. Annot., 87 A.L.R2d 4, 22 (1963). See also RATHKOFF, TnE LAW OF
ZONING AND PLANNING § 2, at 60-3 (3d ed. 1956); 101 CJ.S. Zoning § 192, at
954 (1958); 58 Am. Jur. Zoning § 151 (1948).
[Vol. 2'2
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nature of the business and the types of material and equipment
involved required the availability of large open storage space,
(2) that the fact that the plaintiff occupied a residence on the
premises was not inconsistent with the dominant business char-
acter and use of the property, (8) that the property fronted on
a heavily traveled commercial thoroughfare and the adjacent
property on both sides of the plaintiff's property had been de-
veloped principally for commercial and industrial use, and (4)
that the rear of the plaintiff's property, which was within the
old city limits, was already zoned for residential use and would
constitute a buffer of approximately 200 feet between the area
in question and the nearest residential area to the east. In light
of these facts, the court held that the plaintiff had acquired a
vested right to use the property for the operation of a construc-
tion business and that this right extended to the entire tract.
In considering the question of whether the discontinuance of
the business on the death of the plaintiff's husband constituted
an abandonment, the court noted that, while it is well settled that
the right to continue a nonconforming use may be lost by aban-
donment, "[i]n order to constitute abandonment, it must appear
that there was a discontinuance of the nonconforming use with
the intent to relinquish the 7ight to so use the property."1 9 The
plaintiff's husband, who was president of the construction busi-
ness operated on the property in question, died some six months
after the rezoning application was filed. He had been ill for a
number of years prior to his death, and during that time the
business had steadily declined. Noting that the discontinuance of
the business occurred during the progress of the litigation and
that the only reasonable inference was that, "but for the death
of the appellant's [plaintiff's] husband, the business would not
have been discontinued at that time," 20 the court held that the
closing of the business at the death of the husband was an
involuntary cessation of use and did not constitute abandonment,
since the requisite intent to abandon did not exist.
II. R sraOTrivE CovwNwATs
In Morris v. Townsend21 the defendant, counterclaiming
against the plaintiffs, alleged that the plaintiffs were violating a
restrictive covenant imposed on a portion of their land. The
19. 173 S.E2d at 652, citing 101 CJ.S. Zoning § 198 et seq. (1958). See also
Witt v. Poole, 182 S.C. 110, 188 S.E. 496 (1936).
20. 173 S.E.2d at 653.
21. 253- S.C. 628, 172 S.E2d 819 (1970).
1970]
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plaintiffs had acquired an eighteen acre tract of land on which
they constructed a sixty-unit mobile home park which included,
as one of its advertised attractions, a three acre recreation and
picnic area bordering on the defendant's private lake. A portion
of this recreation area consisted of one and one-tenth acres,
referred to as Parcel B, which was subject to the following re-
striction by deed from the defendant: "(1) That said property
shall be used for residential purposes only, and no trailer, mobile
home, tent, basement or shack shall be placed, located, or used
thereon.
2-
The defendant's counterclaim alleged that the plaintiffs vio-
lated the above restriction by permitting and encouraging cook-
ing, picnicking, games, and other recreational use by the
residents of the trailer park. The plaintiffs, while admitting
that the property was used for picnicking and recreational
purposes, maintained that these activities were not commercial
in nature, but "entirely incidental to residential purposes."U
The court, however, agreed with the finding of the master and
the trial judge that the plaintiffs were making commercial use
of the property in violation of the restrictive covenant. These
findings were predicated on the fact that the recreation area
was available to all tenants of the mobile home park, which fact
had been used by the plaintiffs in advertising designed to at-
tract tenants to their mobile home park, which was undeniably a
commercial enterprise.24
III. MORTGAGES
Flowers v. Oakdale Realty and Water Corp.,25 an action for
ejectment, raises but does not decide a question noted by the
court as being one of novel impression in South Carolina.26 The
question raised is what interests does a mortgagor, after de-
faulting, acquire on purchasing the mortgage property at a
foreclosure sale, when the mortgagor's interest was subject to a
remainder in fee simple in her children. A key question in
22. Id. at 632, 172 S.E2d at 821.
23. Brief for Appellants at 11, Morris v. Townsend, 253 S.C. 628, 172 S.E.2d
819 (1970).
24. See Baltz, Inc. v. R. V. Chandler & Co., 248 S.C. 484, 151 S.E2d 441
(1966).
25. 253 S.C. 522, 171 S.E.2d 863 (1970).
26. Id. at 527, 171 S.E.2d at 865. In reversing this case on other grounds, the
court noted that the case seemed to be one of novel impression and held that
it was improper to sustain the defendant's demurrers so as to disallow the
production of evidence in the matter and thwart arguing the points of law
relative to the novel question.
[Vol. 22
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Flowers was what interest the mortgagor actually held in the
property at the time it was mortgaged. The plaintiff contended
that the mortgagor held a life estate subject to a remainder in
fee simple in the plaintiffs, while the defendants maintained and
the trial judge held that "[u]nder the Will, as stated in the
complaint, Theo Young Flowers [the mortgagor] was the cestui
que trust and not a life tenant."27 On appeal the court, not
having before it the entire will under which Theo Young Flowers
claimed, intimated no view as to the correctness of this ruling.
While the question of what interest the mortgagor acquires
on purchasing the mortgaged property at a foreclosure sale after
default does not appear to have been answered specifically in
South Carolina, it has been treated in other jurisdictions. 28 This
question is also specifically treated in the Restatement of Prop-
erty, where it is stated:
When an estate for life and a future interest exist in
the same land, and both interests become subject to
sale for the collection of a sum of money, and, as be-
tween the owner of the estate for life and the owner of
such future interest, this whole sum is payable by the
owner of the estate for life, or out of his estate, then the
owner of the estate for life, by acquiring the interests
so sold, acquires no interest which he can assert in
derogation of the said future interest.29
In the comments to the above section it is clear that this section
is "applicable to a sale occurring for the collection of a principal
sum, which by the terms of the instrument creating the right
thereto is made primarily payable by the owner of the estate
for life."30 This principle is supported by statements in both
American Jurispradence' and Corpus Juris Secvundum.32
A South Carolina case which is somewhat parallel to the
present case and which lends support to the principle set forth
above is Morris v. Lambert.3  In Morris, which deals with title
to land acquired at a tax sale, the court cited the following:
27. 253 S.C. at 526, 171 S.E.2d at 865.
28. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Kajee, 253 S.W2d 378 (Ky. 1952); Lowery v.
Lyle, 226 Mich. 676, 198 N.W. 245 (1924); Creech v. Wilder, 212 N.C. 162,
193 S.E. 281 (1937) ; Edwards v. Pucket, 268 S.W.2d 582 (Tenn. 1954).
29. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 149 (1936).
30. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 149, comment a at 490 (1936).
31. 33 Am. JuR. Life Estates, Remainders, Etc. §§ 462-63 (1941).
32. 31 C.J.S. Estates § 35 (1964).
33. 218 S.C. 384, 62 S.E.2d 841 (1950).
1970]
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[O]ne who, by virtue of an existing legal or contractual
relation with another is under an obligation to such
person to pay the taxes on lands, but who omits to pay
such taxes, cannot be allowed to strengthen his title to
such land by buying in the tax title when the property
is sold as a consequence of his omission to pay the
taxes on it, and his purchase at the sale will merely
operate as a payment of the taxes, and the title will be
the same as it was before the sale, except that the lien
for taxes is discharged.8
4
Several other South Carolina cases, 3 5 while not directly on point,
seem to support the general principle that a party holding a life
estate may not better his title at the expense of persons having a
future interest in the same land.
IV. DEms AND GnA~s
A. Conflict Between Grant and Habendum
The court, in Bean v. Bean,8 followed a long line of precedent
in this state 7 in once more rejecting the so-called "modern
rule"38 for reconciling a conflict between the granting and
habendum clauses of a deed. The action in Bean was brought
by the plaintiff under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act""
to have the court construe a deed from C. W. Bean, Sr. to his
wife, (the plaintiff, Mrs. Vera Gray Bean), and determine the
rights and interests of the parties. The applicable portions of
the deed out of which the controversy arose are as follows:
(1) The granting clause: "unto the said Vera Bean for
and during the term of her natural life or widowhood,
and in the event of her remarriage, to my son, Charles
William Bean, Jr., his heirs and assigns forever."
(2) The habendum clause: "TO HAVE AND TO
HOLD all and singular the said Premises before men-
tioned unto the said Vera Gray Bean, her Heirs and
Assigns forever."
34. 218 S.C. at 391, 62 S.E.2d at 844, quoting from 51 Am. Jup.u Taxation
§ 1054 (1944).
35. Scurry v. Edwards, 232 S.C. 53, 100 S.E2d 812 (1957); Anderson v.
Butler, 31 S.C. 183, 9 S.E. 797 (1889); McCelvey v. Thomson, 7 S.C. 185
(1875).
36. 253 S.C. 340, 170 S.E.2d 654 (1969).
37. See Note, The Effect of A Conflict Between The Granting and Habendum
Clauses in Deeds in South Carolina, 10 S.C.L.Q. 431 (1958).
38. Id. at 433.
39. S.C. CODE AN. § 10-2001, et seq. (1962).
[VOL 22
9
Legare: Property
Published by Scholar Commons,
PROPF TY SURVEYED
(3) The warranty clause: "And I do hereby bind My-
self and my Heirs, Executors, and Administrators to
warrant forever defend all and singular the said prem-
ises unto the said Vera Gray Bean, her Heirs and As-
signs, against me and my Heirs and against every person
whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same or
any part thereof.
'40
The plaintiff contended that, under the terms of the deed
above quoted, she was the owner in fee simple of the real estate
in question,41 while the defendant maintained that her estate was
"limited to the term of her natural life or widowhood, with the
[vested] remainder to him in fee simple upon her death or
remarriage."42 Although the master recommended that the court
declare that the deed conveyed to the plaintiff a fee simple title
subject to the conditional limitation that, should she remarry,
the title and interest would vest in the defendant, the trial court
held that "the remainder interest in the land is now vested ab-
solutely in fee simple in the respondent.' 
3
In reversing the judgment of the trial court, the supreme
court first reviewed the rules for construing a deed in South
Carolina. The keystone of these rules appears to be that "the
cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the parties, unless that intention contravenes some
weZ settled Pule of Zaw or public policy."44
In further developing these rules of construction, the court
stated:
In ascertaining such intention the deed must be con-
strued as a whole, and effect given to every part thereof,
if such can be done consistently with the law. Intention
is a term of art and signifies the meaning of the writing;
however, the intention of a grantor will not be allowed
to prevail if it runs counter to an established rule of
law.
45
An examination of the granting clause of the deed in question
disclosed that, if the plaintiff remarried, the property would go
40. 253 S.C. at 342, 170 S.E2d at 655.
41. Brief for Appellant at 3, Bean v. Bean, 253 S.C. 340, 170 S.E.2d 654
(1969) ; indicating that, as used in this brief, the term, fee simple, includes
the fee defeasible or determinable estate.
42. 253 S.C. at 342, 170 S.E2d at 655.
43. Id. at 343, 170 S.E2d at 655.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Id. (citations omitted).
1970)
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to the defendant, but that there was no disposition of the fee to
the property upon the natural termination of the plaintiff's life
estate. Thus, the granting clause of the deed failed to make a
complete disposition of the estate without recourse to the
habendum and warranty clauses. With regard to a situation such
as this, where the granting clause of the deed is incomplete, the
court found that:
The rule in this State is that where an incomplete or
indefinite estate is conveyed by the granting clause, as
for instance where no words of inheritance accompany
the grant, or where the granting clause creates a life
estate, resort may be had to the habendum for
the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the grantor
and thus a life estate may be enlarged into a fee simple
estate.4
6
The court, in holding that the plaintiff took a fee simple
defeasible estate subject to divestment in the event that she
remarried, and that in that event title would vest in the defen-
dant, relied on the court's rationale in Wilson v. Poston.47 The
Wilson court held that, where a complete estate is not created in
the granting clause and the granting clause contains a condi-
tional limitation, the granting clause with its conditional limita-
tion must be taken as it stands when the habendum clause is
used to enlarge the incomplete estate.
The defendant had relied on the rule that "where the granting
clause in a deed purports to convey title in fee simple absolute,
that estate may not be cut down by subsequent words in the
same instrument.148 The court, while apparently accepting the
rule as stated, distinguished the case relied on by the defendant
from the present case by noting that, in the cases cited by the
defendant, absolute (complete) estates were created in the grant-
ing clause, while the granting clause in the present case created
an incomplete estate.
B. Vested Remainders
Lee v. Citizens and Southern National Bank49 was an action
by the vendor against the purchaser for specific performance of
46. Id., citing Wilson v. Poston, 129 S.C. 345, 123 S.E. 849 (1924) ; Zobel v.
Little, 120 S.C. 212, 113 S.E. 68 (1922); Chavis v. Chavis, 57 S.C. 173, 35
S.E. 507 (1900).
47. 129 S.C. 345, 123 S.E. 849 (1924).
48. Brief for Respondent at 7, Bean v. Bean, 253 S.C. 340, 170 S.E2d 654
(1969).
49. 253 S.C. 556, 172 S.E.2d 114 (1970).
[Vol. 2
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a contract to purchase realty. The vendor had tendered a deed
to the defendant, who refused to perform and alleged that the
plaintiff did not have a good title which he could convey. The
defendant maintained that under the terms of the will of Robert
A. Smythe, Richard Smythe Lee had a contingent remainder
which could not be conveyed.
The testator devised a life estate to W. Loring Lee, Jr., with
the remainder at his death to his son, Richard Smythe Lee. The
terms of the will provided that, should the life tenant prede-
cease the testator, then his wife would take the life estate with
the remainder to her son, Richard. The will further provided
that should Richard predecease the testator, then his brother
Loring would take the remainder.50 The defendants contended
that in order for Richard to take, he must survive not only the
testator, but both of his parents as well, and that his remainder
was therefore contingent.51
The supreme court, in finding for the plaintiff, stated in a
per curiam opinion adopting the Order of Judge McFaddin:
[Tihe words "should Richard Staythe Lee predecease
me and both of his parents" have the opposite meaning
than that contended by the defendant. The word "and"
is to be construed literally and when Richard survived
the testator it then became impossible for him to pre-
decease "me and both of his parents", and the estate
thereby vested in him, in remainder, in fee simple. The
testator could not have intended that the remainderman
survive all three because such an intention would be
illogical.52
The court further found that the four requirements for creating
a vested remainder, as set forth in Justice Cothran's concurring
opinion in Ainger v. Avinger,53 were met in this case.
50. Id. at 561, 172 S.F_2d at 116.
51. Id. at 560, 172 S.E2d at 116.
52. Id. at 561, 172 S.E2d at 116.
53. 116 S.C. 125, 130, 107 S.E. 26, 28 (1921).
[T]o create a vested remainder the following essential elements
must appear: (1) The estate in remainder must be fixed and
certain in the remaindermen at the time of its creation; (2) implied
in the foregoing, the vesting of the remainder must not depend
upon the performance or happening of a condition precedent;
(3) the person to take in remainder must be an ascertained person
in being; (4) the enjoyment of the possession of the estate in
remainder is simply postponed; there being no obstacle to such
enjoyment except the preceding particular estate.
1970]
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V. CONDEMNATI0N
A. Damages
State Highway Department v. SMith5 4 presented the question
of whether it was proper to permit testimony and give jury
instructions as to depreciation of personal property used by a
landowner in the conduct of his business on land condemned by
the highway department, where the personal property was not
taken by the condemnor. The personal property in question
consisted of such items as a meat case, an adding machine, a.
cash register, etc., used by the landowner in the conduct of his
business on the condemned land. The landowner had removed
this personal property from the premises in anticipation of
condemnation but before the property was taken.
The supreme court, in holding that the personal property
was not included in the taking, and that the lower court erred
in allowing testimony as to damages to personal property,
stated:
When land is taken under the power of eminent do-
main, the ownership of personalty kept on the premises
taken, but not permanently affixed thereto, is not af-
fected; and the owner is entitled to remove, same as was
done here. Actually, here the removal of the personal
property was done by the landowner before the taking
of the land and buildings thereon.55
In support of its holding the court quoted from 'Williams v. State
Highway CommissonP55 to the effect that a majority of state
courts have held that in the absence of a statute or agreement
to the contrary, breakage or other injury to personal property
caused by its removal from condemned land cannot be con-
sidered as an element of damages, since such losses do not
constitute a taking of property.5 7
In a spirited dissent, Justice Bussey, while noting that the
majority view is supported by what appears to be the clear
weight of persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, stated
that the question presented was one of novel impression in this
jurisdiction. Distinguishing the rationale of the cases cited in
Williams as "not in accord with our constitutional provision and
the prior interpretations thereof," 8 he further stated:
54. 253 S.C. 639, 172 S.E2d 827 (1970).
55. Id. at 641, 172 S.E.2d at 828.
56. 252 N.C. 141, 113 S.E2d 263 (1960).
57. 253 S.C. at 642, 172 S.E.2d at 828.
58. 253 S.C. at 643, 172 S.E.2d at 829.
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We have consistently held that a deprivation of the
ordinary beneficial use and enjoyment of one's property
is equivalent to the taking of it, and is as much a
"taking" as though the property were actually appro-
priated to the public use. We have consistently held that
within the purview of this constitutional provision there
is no real distinction between taking and damaging and
that the least damage to property constitutes a taking
within the purview of the Constitution.
It is true that none of the cited cases deal with damage
to personal property as opposed to damage to real
property, but since personal property is property with-
in the constitutional provision, the fact that personal
property was not involved in these cases affords no
true basis for distinction.5 9
Considering the question of compensation for personal prop-
erty taken or injured under condemnation proceedings to be a
constitutional question, Justice Bussey noted that section 33-135
of the 1962 Code of Laws6 ° specifically provides for special
damages for the landowner as a part of his compensation upon
acquisition of a highway or right of way. Stating that he was
unaware of any decisions confining special damages to only
such as are sustained in connection with the remainder of the
real property, he further stated:
Special damages should include any damages or de-
creases in actual value in the remainder of the land-
owner's property, whether real or personal, which are
the direct and proximate consequence of the acquisition
of the right of way. Such is the only possible interpreta-
tion of the statutory provision if just compensation is
to be awarded in compliance with the Constitution.0 1
B. Taking by a Municipality
In Cameron v. City of Chester62 the court reaffirmed its de-
cision in Sease v. City of Spartanburg a3 that, where the state
has delegated the authority to take property for a public use,
"the determination by the City of the question of necessity for
the condemnation will not be upset by the courts in the absence
59. Id. (citations omitted).
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-135 (1962).
61. 253 S.C. at 644, 172 S.E.2d at 829.
62. 253 S.C. 574, 172 S.E.2d 306 (1970).
63. 242 S.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 683 (1963).
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of a showing of fraud, bad faith, or clear abuse of discretion."64
In Oameron the City of Chester had instituted condemnation
proceedings 5 to acquire the plaintiff's property for use as a
part of an off-street parking facility. The plaintiffs brought
suit to enjoin the city from condemning their property on the
grounds that there was no necessity for the city to exercise its
power of eminent domain; that, by so doing, the city was guilty
of fraud, bad faith, and abuse of discretion; and that the prop-
erty was not sought for a public use. In affirming the decision
of the trial court, the court promptly disposed of the contention
that a municipal parking facility was not a public use by calling
attention to its decision in Sammons v. City of Beaufort,"6
where the court held that off-street parking for all members of
the public did constitute a public use.
Turning next to the ground of lack of necessity, the court
reaffirmed its decision in Sease. In Sease the court had held
that in this state the rule is that the decision as to the question
of necessity lies with the one to whom authority to take property
has been delegated, and that the decision is not subject to review
by the court in the absence of a showing of fraud, bad faith,
or clear abuse of discretion.6 7 The court concluded that in the
present case the charges of fraud, bad faith, and abuse of dis-
cretion were not sustained by the evidence.
VI. RIPARIAN RIGHTs
Monris v. Townsend68 presented the question of the right of a
landowner to the use and benefit of a lake covering part of his
property, where the lake was created by the erection of a dam by
another landowner on his own property. Over a period of years,
the defendant had acquired approximately 200 acres of land
bordering on both sides of Big Jackson Creek in Richland
County. In 1963 at his own expense he constructed a dam which
created a lake covering some 50-55 acres, one to two acres of
which covered part of an adjoining tract acquired by the
plaintiffs on June 17, 1967. On June 7, 1967, the defendant had
acquired from the plaintiffs' predecessors in title an easement to
flood and submerge and impound waters in perpetuity upon the
64. 253 S.C. 574, 577, 172 S.E.2d 306, 307 (1970).
65. The condemnation proceedings were instituted under the provisions of
the Off-Street Parking Facilities Act, S.C. CoDa ANN. § 59-566 et seq. (1962).
66. 225 S.C. 490, 83 S.E.2d 153 (1954).
67. 242 S.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 683 (1963).
68. 253 S.C. 628, 172 S.E.2d 819 (1970).
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lands now owned by the plaintiffs. After acquiring title to the
tract which included some of the land covered by the defendant's
lake, the plaintiffs constructed on this tract a sixty unit mobile
home park which included a recreation area on the lake.
In this action the plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction to
compel the defendant to remove a no trespassing sign which he
had erected on his property. The defendant, counterclaiming,
alleged that he built the dam which created the lake at his own
expense and had the sole right to the use and control of the lake.
The recommendations of the master in equity, that the complaint
be dismissed and that the relief sought in the counterclaim be
granted, were adopted in toto by the trial judge. On appeal the
supreme court held that the trial judge did not err in enjoining
and restraining the plaintiffs from using the waters of the lake
either above the property owned by the plaintiffs or above the
property owned by the defendant.
The court discussed its holding in two parts. With regard to
the plaintiffs' use of the waters of the lake above the defendant's
land, the court stated, "One not a riparian owner (as the plain-
tiffs here), but seeking to make use of the waters of a lake
created by the dam of another, must base his claim upon a right
acquired through prescription or grant."69 In so holding, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that "[ilt would seem
that the distinction between the natural and a man-made lake
should have little basis for such a distinction in the law. 70
The plaintiffs had argued that, since Big Jackson Creek was
undeniably a natural stream or creek, the defendant's action
in constructing the dam had "proceeded only to one step
further"71 than nature in placing the waters of the creek where
they were, the implication being that the plaintiffs should be
considered riparian owners. Had the plaintiffs been successful
in this line of reasoning, they would have come under the gen-
eral rule that
[t]he owner of a part of the bed of a lake or pond has
exclusive rights in the water above it, but a riparian
owner may generally use the surface of the whole lake
as far as such use does not interfere with the reasonable
use by the riparian owner.72
69. Id. at 633, 172 S.E.2d at 822.
70., Brief for Appellants at 4, Morris v. Townsend, 253 S.C. 628, 172
S.E.2d 819 (1970).
71. Id.
72. 93 CJ.S. Waters § 105 (1956), cited in Brief for Appellants at 4, 253
S.C. 628, 172 S.E2d 819 (1970).
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The court's discounting of the plaintiffs' status as riparian
owners was apparently based on acceptance of the defendant's
contentions that "[r]iparian rights attach to lands adjoining
permanent bodies of water," 78 and that, "[in the development of
the law of waters, only those owners along a natural watercourse
or touching a natural lake are entitled to share in the use of
waters where said waters are non-navigable." 74 The court noted
further that an examination of the three instruments involved
in the creation of the easement in favor of the defendant dis-
closed nothing to indicate an intent on the part of the grantors
or the grantee that the defendant surrender his rights to control
his lake. The court concluded, "The defendant as owner in fee
simple of his land, clearly has the exclusive right to. use and
control that part of the lake which lies above his own land, and
has the right to exclude plaintiffs and all other persons claiming
by, under, or through them, from any use whatsoever of the
defendant's lands and water above said land."
75
With regard to the relative rights of the parties to the use of
the waters of the lake which overlay the plaintiffs' land, the
court first considered the plaintiffs' rights under the defendant's
easement to flood and submerge the plaintiffs' land. The court
found the defendant's easement to be analogous to a railroad's
easement to lay track or a telephone company's easement to erect
poles and wires across the landowner's property. Maintaining
that no one would seriously argue that the landowner was
entitled to use the train or to connect a telephone to the wires,
the court stated, "By a like token, in this case the defendant
acquired an easement to extend the waters of his lake onto the
property of the adjoining landowners, and it cannot.be logically
argued that the landowners have acquired the right to use the
water and the lake it composes to their own benefit." 76 Referring
to the examples cited and to the instant case, the court held
that, "[i]f .. . the landowner is to acquire an interest in rail-
road track or in the telephone lines or in the lake waters, the
rights would have to appear in the instruments creating the
easement." 77 The court found that in the instant case the instru-
73. Brief for Respondents at 7, Morris v. Townsend, 253 S.C. 628, 172
S.E.2d 819 (1970), citing 93 C.J.S. Waters § 104 (1956).
74. Brief for Respondents at 7, Morris v. Townsend, 253 S.C. 628, 172
S.E.2d 819 (1970) (emphasis added).
75. 253 S.C. at 634, 172 S.E.2d at 822.
76. 253 S.C. at 635, 172 S.E.2d at 822.
77. Id. at 635, 172 S.E.2d at 823.
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ments involved did not give the plaintiffs any interest in or
privilege to use the waters of the defendant's lake."'
VIi. STEMTSY AND HaiHrwAys
In City of Greenville v. BozemaA79 the plaintiff brought an
action for declaratory judgment seeking, inter alia, (1) a dec-
laration concerning the validity of the closing of certain public
streets and (2) the rights of the various property owners abut-
ting thereon. In a per curiam opinion the supreme court adopted
the judgment of the trial court validating the city's actions and
settling the rights of the various property owners in the closed
streets.
This action arose out of an agreement between the city of
Greenville and The Peoples National Bank regarding the re-
development of a three block area in downtown Greenville. A
necessary part of this redevelopment was the closing of several
streets and the closing of a part of another street. In arriving
at its holding that the action of the city in closing the streets
in question was valid and proper, the court noted that the
city had conducted very thorough and extensive investigations
and studies of the project and that the agreement had been
entered into only after full public hearings and due consid-
eration of all surrounding facts. The court went on to state
that under section 47-1327 of the South Carolina Code of Laws80
'the city unquestionably had the authority to close the streets in
question so long as it proceeded properly and that "the Courts
will not interfere with the exercise of discretionary powers by a
municipal body except in cases of fraud or clear abuse of
power ... ."I" With regard to one defendant's opposition to
the closing of the streets on the ground of inconvenience because
of his having to use a more circuitous route, the court found
that the inconvenience was outweighed by the advantages to be
derived by the public generally.
Turning to the question of the rights of abutting owners to
ownership in the streets in question, the court stated:
[T]he rule which is generally accepted and which is
followed in South Carolina is that in the absence of some
statutory disposition, abandonment or vacation of a
78. Id. at 635, 172 S.E2d at 822.
79. 175 S.E2d 211 (S.C. 1970).
80. S.C. CoDF, ANN. § 47-1327 (1962).
81. 175 S.E.2d at 215, citing Bethel ME. Church v. City of Greenville, 211
S.C. 442, 45 S.E2d 841 (1947).
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public street vests absolute possession and title in the
abutting property owners and not the original owner,
at least unless the original owner is the abutting owner
at the time of the vacation, or has specifically reserved
the right of reservation on vacation.8
2
Noting no evidence in the record to show that the original owner
had specifically reserved the right of reservation on vacation, the
court held that the rule stated above was applicable and that
the vacated portions of the streets in question were to vest in
the abutting property owners, to the center line of the street, at
such time as the streets were actually vacated.
T. C. R. Lammm, Jn.
82. 175 S.E.2d at 216, citing State Highway Dep't v. Allison, 246 S.C.
389 143 S.E.2d 800 (1965); City of Rock Hill v. Cothran, 209 S.C. 357, 40
S.E.2d 239 (1946).
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